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THE HAGUE PRINCIPLES, THE CISG, 
AND THE “BATTLE OF FORMS” 
Peter Winship* 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is about 
to adopt Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial 
Contracts (Principles).1  Assume an enterprise in Texas agrees to 
provide commercial services to an enterprise in Peru, and the parties 
agree that the law of Texas applies to any dispute arising from their 
contract. Will a court enforce this choice-of-law agreement?  Courts in 
most States will do so.  For these States the Principles provide a 
codification of basic rules together with some refinements. Some 
States, however, do not enforce such agreements or restrict their 
enforceability.  The Principles and the accompanying Commentary 
seek to persuade these latter States that recognizing party autonomy as 
to the choice of law is preferable. As the Introduction to the Principles 
states, “[p]arty autonomy . . . enhances certainty and predictability . . . 
                                                 
*  James Cleo Thompson Sr. Trustee Professor, SMU Dedman School of 
Law. 
1   The Hague Conference on Private International Law published a revised 
draft in July 2014.  HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE 
DRAFT HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS, Prel. Doc. No. 6 (revised) (July 2014) [hereinafter Hague Principles or 
Principles], available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2014pd06rev_en.pdf.  
Member States of the Hague Conference had until August 31, 2014 to submit 
comments on recent amendments to the text of the Commentary.  COUNCIL ON 
GENERAL AFFAIRS AND POLICY OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE 
COUNCIL, ¶ 2 (April 2014), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2014concl_en.pdf.  In the light of these 
comments, the Conference’s Working Group will prepare a definitive final text, 
which the Conference will then circulate to Member States.  If there are no objections 
within sixty days the draft will be an official text of the Hague Conference. Id. [Ed. 
The Principles entered into force on March 19, 2015. The final text may be found at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt40en.pdf]. 
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and recognises that parties to a contract may be in the best position to 
determine which set of legal principles is most suitable for their 
transaction.”2 
The Hague Principles are no stranger to the International 
Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law. At the Academy’s July 
2012 meeting in Mexico City, Neil Cohen, a participant in the Working 
Group drafting the Principles, traced the history of the project and 
identified the principal issues addressed by the Hague draft.3  Since his 
report the number of commentaries analyzing the Principles has 
grown.4 Most of this literature comments on the Principles as a whole.  
This paper, however, is more limited in scope. It considers only one 
issue: the relation of the Hague Principles to the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)5 
when parties to an international contract of sales refer during 
negotiations to their standard terms and these standard terms include 
choice-of-law terms that conflict. 
Paragraph 1 b) of Article 6 of the Principles purports to answer 
whether parties to an international commercial contract—including an 
international contract of sale—have agreed on a choice of law when 
they make such references without resolving differences in their 
standard terms.  Article 6 as a whole provides: 
Hague Principles 
Article 6 (Agreement on choice of law and battle of 
forms) 
Paragraph 1 
                                                 
2   Hague Principles, supra note 1, at ¶ I.3. 
3   Neil B. Cohen, The Proposed Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International 
Commercial Contracts, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE GLOBAL TRADE OVER THE LAST 
THIRTY YEARS 157-71 (Elvia Arcelia Quintana Adriano, ed., 2014). 
4  See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, HAGUE 
DRAFT PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: 
BIBLIOGRAPHY, available at  
http://www.hcch.net/upload/draft_principles_bibl-e.pdf.  
5   Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671 [hereinafter CISG]. 
2015 Winship 4:1 
153 
Subject to paragraph 2 - 
whether the parties have agreed to a choice of law is 
determined by the law that was purportedly agreed to; 
if the parties have used standard terms designating two 
different laws and under both of these laws the same 
standard terms prevail, the law designated in the 
prevailing terms applies; if under these laws different 
standard terms prevail, or if under one or both of these 
laws no standard terms prevail, there is no choice of 
law. 
Paragraph 2 
The law of the State in which a party has its 
establishment determines whether that party has 
consented to the choice of law if, under the 
circumstances, it would not be reasonable to make that 
determination under the law specified in paragraph 1.6 
The solution in paragraph 1 b) draws heavily on the thoughtful 
analysis of Thomas Kadner Graziano, a Swiss member of the Working 
Group.7 In his preliminary analysis of the Hague Principles, Symeon 
Symeonides rightfully pays tribute to Professor Kadner’s contribution 
to resolving this “difficult problem”8—a problem acknowledged to be 
one of the more challenging problems in private international law.9  
Because of its novelty, the solution in Article 6 will no doubt attract 
considerable attention from scholars and possibly judges and 
arbitrators. To assist the reader, the Commentary to Article 6 analyzes 
four scenarios, the fourth of which purports to apply the Principle to 
a contract of sale governed by the CISG. 
                                                 
6   Hague Principles, supra note 1, at art. 6. 
7  Thomas Kadner Graziano, Solving the Riddle of Conflicting Choice of Law 
Clauses in Battle of Forms Situations: The Hague Solution, 14 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 71 (2013).  
8   Symeon C. Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for 
International Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 877 (2013). 
9   See generally Gerhard Dannemann, The “Battle of the Forms” and the Conflict 
of Laws, in LEX MERCATORIA: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW IN 
HONOUR OF FRANCIS REYNOLDS 199 (F.D. Rose ed., 2000).  
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This paper considers only this last scenario: the relation of the 
Hague Principles to the CISG when a seller and a buyer fail to resolve 
differences in their choice-of-law standard terms.  I leave to separate 
papers the analysis of Article 6 and an evaluation of the Principles as a 
whole. The thesis of this paper is that the solution offered in the 
Commentary is not the only reasonable way to analyze the scenario. 
I.         PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
A.       The “Battle of Forms” 
The “battle of forms” is to academic lawyers what a candle is 
to moths.  Most of my acquaintances have written about the “battle.” 
They ask: Do persons who exchange forms with different pre-
established standard terms have a contract when neither reads the 
other’s form but each performs as if there is a contract?  And if there 
is a contract, what are its terms? They classify national and 
international solutions to these questions with descriptive tags—”no 
contract”; “first shot”; “last shot”; “knock out”; “hybrid”—used by 
aficionados who barely pause to elaborate.10 These classifications and 
the concept of non-negotiated standard terms are so familiar I will not 
take up space to define them. 
Something, however, should be said about the “battle of 
forms” and the CISG. As with other laws, there is a growing literature 
analyzing the problem.11 Attempts at the 1980 Diplomatic Convention 
to address the issue with a specifically-tailored provision failed.12 It is 
                                                 
10  See generally Kadner Graziano, supra note 7; see also Dannemann, supra 
note 9. 
11  A search in the bibliography of published commentaries maintained by 
the CISG Database maintained by Pace Law School yielded seventy-four entries with 
the word “battle” in the title.  Bibliography, PACE LAW SCH. INST. OF INT’L 
COMMERCIAL LAW,   
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/biblio.html (last visited June 30, 2014).  
12  At the 1980 diplomatic conference, Belgium proposed to add a 
paragraph (4) to Article 19 (“(4) When the offeror and the offeree have expressly (or 
implicitly) referred in the course of negotiations to general conditions the terms of which 
are mutually exclusive the conflict clauses should be considered not to form an 
integral part of the contract.”).  Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/11 (Apr. 7, 1980). 
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generally agreed that the solution must be found in Article 19 CISG, 
which, with slight modifications, requires the terms of an acceptance 
to be the same as those in the offer.13 Two solutions–”knock out” and 
“last shot”—have found favor with both courts and commentators. 
There appears to be a trend among commentators to favor the knock-
out solution;14 it is more difficult to identify a trend in the decisions of 
judges and arbitrators.15 
Despite the academic interest in the subject, most authors 
concede that it is far from clear that the “battle” is of much interest in 
practice. This is certainly true with respect to the CISG.  During the 
last twenty-five years, only a relatively small number of reported CISG 
cases have wrestled with the issue of conflicting standard terms.16  As 
for a “battle” between differing choice-of-law terms, the number of 
reported cases can be counted on the fingers of one hand.17 
B.      CISG Policies 
Before turning to analysis of the specific issue addressed, 
several basic policies embodied in the provisions in CISG Part I 
(Sphere of application and general provisions) should be noted. 
Article 1(1) is the basic provision defining when the 
Convention is applicable: 
CISG 
Article 1 
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of 
goods between parties whose places of business are in 
different States: 
                                                 
13   CISG, supra note 5, at art. 19.  
14  See COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS Art. 19, ¶¶ 34-38 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg 
Schwenzer, eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
15  See generally UNCITRAL, Digest of Case Law on the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at 103-07 (2012).   
16   Id.  
17   Id.  
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when the States are Contracting States; or 
when the rules of private international law lead to the 
application of the law of a Contracting State.18 
Subsequent articles qualify this statement by excluding, for 
example, particular sale transactions and particular issues. For the 
purpose of this paper, however, the most relevant qualification is 
Article 6, which allows a seller and buyer to agree to exclude 
application of the CISG when the Convention would otherwise be 
applicable.  Article 6 provides in relevant part: 
CISG 
Article 6 
The parties may exclude the application of this 
Convention . . . .19 
It is the interplay between these CISG scope provisions and 
Article 6 of the Hague Principles that is at issue in this paper. 
When considering this issue, three general provisions in CISG 
Part I are of particular importance. Two of these provisions direct the 
reader as to how to interpret or construe the Convention, while the 
third sets out rules on the interpretation of a party’s acts or statements. 
Article 7(1) states: 
CISG 
Article 7 
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard 
is to be had to its international character and to the 
need to promote uniformity in its application and 
the observance of good faith in international trade.20 
                                                 
18   CISG, supra note 5, at art. 1. 
19   Id. at art. 6. 
20   Id. at art. 7(1) (emphasis added). 
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Article 7(2) goes on to provide that: 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this 
Convention which are not expressly settled by it are to 
be settled in conformity with the general principles on 
which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, 
in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the 
rules of private international law.21 
As for the interpretation of a party’s statements, sub-articles 
(1) and (2) of Article 8 state: 
CISG 
Article 8 
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements 
made by and other conduct of a party are to be 
interpreted according to his intent where the other 
party knew or could not have been unaware what that 
intent was. 
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, 
statements made by and other conduct of a party are 
to be interpreted according to the understanding that a 
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party 
would have had in the same circumstances.22 
Article 9 supplements this article by binding parties to usages 
of trade and their course of dealing with each other.23 
II.         THE BASIC SETTING 
The Commentary to Article 6 of the Hague Principles analyzes 
the following scenario (Scenario 4): 
                                                 
21   Id. at art. 7(2) (emphasis added). 
22   Id. at art. 8(1) and (2). 
23   Id. at art. 9. 
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Party A to a transborder sales contract designates in its 
standard terms the law of State X, which is a CISG 
Contracting State, as the law applicable to the contract. 
Party B designates in its standard terms the law of State 
Y, which is also a CISG Contracting State, but 
explicitly excludes the CISG. The general contract law 
of State Y follows the knock-out rule. The case is 
brought before a court in a CISG Contracting State.24 
Paragraphs 6.25-6.27 of the Commentary apply Article 6 of the 
Principles to this scenario and conclude that the parties have not 
agreed on the designation of an applicable law and therefore have not 
excluded application of the CISG.25 
The analysis in the Commentary is straightforward. The law 
designated by each party’s choice-of-law term is examined to 
determine how that law would resolve a “battle of forms.” If under 
one or both of these laws no term prevails, the parties are deemed not 
to have chosen the applicable law.  Party A’s designation of the law of 
State X leads—in accordance with the general consensus of courts and 
commentators—to application of the CISG rather than domestic 
contract law.  Article 19, the relevant contract formation rule of the 
CISG, is then identified. The Commentary accurately notes that there 
is no consensus among courts and commentators on whether Article 
19 is a “knock out” or “last shot” rule, and the Commentary does not 
try to resolve this issue of CISG interpretation.  A separate analysis of 
Party B’s choice-of-law term is then made, although made simpler 
because the scenario itself indicates that State Y’s general contract 
law—which is applicable, because Party B’s term expressly excludes 
the CISG—follows the knock-out rule.  Because no term prevails 
under one (or possibly both, depending on interpretation of CISG 
Article 19) of the laws designated by the two forms, the alternative set 
out in paragraph 1 b) of Article 6 of the Hague Principles provides that 
there has been no choice of the applicable law.26 
A basic assumption of the Commentary is that no part of the 
CISG is relevant when determining whether the parties have agreed to 
                                                 
24   Hague Principles, supra note 1, Commentary at ¶ 6.24. 
25   Id. at ¶¶ 6.24-6.27.  
26   Id.  
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exclude the Convention pursuant to Article 6 of the CISG: “[i]f the 
parties enter into a choice of law agreement excluding the CISG, the 
CISG will not apply”27 and “[because under the doctrine of 
severability] the choice of law agreement is a separate contract that is 
distinguished from the main contract (e.g., the sales contract) . . . the 
Principles govern the choice of law agreement, whereas the CISG 
governs the sales contract . . . .”28 
The issue is therefore whether this assumption is correct. In a 
separately published analysis, Professor Kadner concedes that his 
position—which supports the solution in the Hague Principles—is 
contrary to the “currently dominant position.”29 He cites five authors 
and one court decision as favoring the view that the contract formation 
provisions of the CISG (Part II: Arts. 14-24) apply to the formation of 
the choice-of-law agreement.30  He rejects this position on the principal 
ground that a choice-of-law agreement is distinct (“severable”) from 
the contract of sale.31  For this proposition, he relies on Article 7 of the 
Hague Principles, which states the severability principle,32 and Article 
4 of the CISG, which states that the Convention “governs only the 
formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the 
seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”33  In support of his 
interpretation, Professor Kadner suggests several useful consequences.  
He notes that looking to general contract law rather than Part II of the 
CISG has the advantage of providing more comprehensive contract 
formation rules.34  He also points out that, because Article 4(a) of the 
CISG excludes coverage of issues of validity, a solution that leads to 
                                                 
27   Id. at ¶ 6.25. 
28   Id. at ¶ 6.26 
29   To be accurate, Professor Kadner addresses the issue in his analysis of 
paragraph (1)(b) of Article 1 of the CISG.  That paragraph provides that the CISG 
governs a contract of sale if rules of private international law lead to the law of a 
Contracting State. Professor Kadner’s analysis of Article 1 is equally applicable to 
Article 6 of the CISG.  Kadner, supra note 7, at 95-98. 
30   Id. 
31   Id. 
32   Hague Principles, supra note 1, art. 7.  
33   CISG, supra note 5, art 4. 
34   Kadner, supra note 7, at 97. 
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general contract law provides a single law for issues of both formation 
and validity.35 
Without necessarily endorsing the dominant position—at least 
as it is summarized by Professor Kadner—I find Professor Kadner’s 
reliance on Article 4 of the CISG unpersuasive.  On its face, the CISG 
governs more than contract formation (Part II) and the rights and 
obligations of sellers and buyers (Part III).  The CISG clearly also 
governs the Convention’s sphere of application, not to mention the 
Final Provisions in Part IV.  There is little reason to think that the 
general provisions in Part I (Arts. 7-13) do not apply to interpretation 
of the sphere of application provisions (Arts. 1-6) as well as to the 
provisions of Parts II and III.  Thus, if the policies and rules of 
interpretation found in Part I support the proposition that the CISG 
determines whether the parties have agreed to exclude the CISG, there 
is no need to rely on direct application of Article 19 of the CISG. 
Moreover, I think Professor Kadner pays insufficient attention 
to the CISG policies and principles of interpretation noted above in 
this paper’s preliminary remarks.  Although the CISG does not deny a 
role for private international law as its predecessor (Uniform Law on 
the International Sale of Goods (ULIS)) did,36 the CISG subordinates 
the role of private international law to the Convention’s provisions and 
the general principles on which the CISG is based.  The subordination 
of private international law is evident in the basic scope provision of 
Article 1(1) of the CISG: if the seller and buyer have their places of 
business in different Contracting States, the CISG applies;37 only if that 
paragraph is not satisfied does private international law play a role in 
making the CISG apply. To argue that private international rules are 
the exclusive source of rules when determining whether the parties have 
agreed to exclude the CISG pursuant to Article 6 is to upset the agreed 
relation between the CISG and private international law.  It should not 
be forgotten that until it is shown that the parties agreed to exclude the 
CISG pursuant to Article 6 of the CISG, the Convention governs. In 
                                                 
35   Id. at 96-97.  
36   Uniform Law of International Sales, art. 2.  The Uniform Law is set 
out in the annex to the 1964 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 (1972). 
37   CISG, supra note 5, art. 1(1)(a). 
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other words, Article 6 itself is in a sense subordinate to the scope 
provisions of Article 1(1).38 
One reason for subordinating private international law is that 
the CISG endorses the policy of uniformity, and private international 
rules do not always lead to uniform outcomes. This is true in the 
context of contracts and is especially true when parties use standard 
terms, where the rules are uncertain in part because of the failure of 
commentators to analyze the issues. There is no assurance that the 
Hague Principles will be successful in securing uniformity by their 
formula for analyzing the battle of forms.  Even if widely implemented, 
the Hague Principles allow for potential non-uniform outcomes.  For 
example, the Principles rely on non-uniform rules of interpretation 
unlike the CISG, which, as noted earlier, incorporates uniform 
provisions on interpretation of the parties’ statements and on the 
binding quality of the parties’ course of dealing and usages of trade. 
III.        MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO 4 
In the scenario set out in the Hague Commentary, the judge 
sits in a State party to the CISG.39  The judge is bound by Article 1(1)(a) 
to apply the CISG unless it can be shown that Party A and Party B 
agreed to exclude the Convention pursuant to Article 6.  How the 
judge might analyze the issues involved may best be understood by 
considering several simpler hypothetical cases. 
If Party A and Party B had negotiated a term that expressly 
excluded the CISG but did not designate the applicable law, the issue 
whether the parties agreed to the term is a matter of interpreting Article 
6 of the CISG.  The CISG does not provide an explicit answer, so, 
before turning to private international law, Article 7(2) directs the 
reader to look to the general principles on which the CISG is based. 
These principles can be derived from Part II and can be summarized 
                                                 
38   For an analysis of the relation of Article 6 of the CISG and private 
international law, see COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, supra note 14, Art. 6, ¶¶ 4-5 (“The formation and 
interpretation of the exclusion of the CISG is subject to the rules of the Convention 
as the CISG determines its sphere of application autonomously”).  
39   Hague Principles, supra note 1, Commentary at ¶ 6.24. 
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as requiring clear evidence of actual agreement. Article 19 would not 
be directly applicable, but indirectly the insistence on a “mirror-image” 
acceptance of an offer is evidence of this principle.  If a court should 
find that there was an agreement to exclude the CISG, the court would 
then apply private international law rules to determine which State’s 
law applies when the parties have not chosen the applicable law. 
This analysis becomes only slightly more complicated if Party 
A and Party B each includes in its standard terms a term excluding the 
CISG without designating another law as the law applicable. The 
complication arises because each of the exclusion terms must be read 
in the light of Article 8 of the CISG (and, when relevant, Article 9 on 
binding trade usages and the parties’ course of dealing). If each 
exclusion term is unambiguous there would be consensus on exclusion 
and again a judge would apply the national law applicable by virtue of 
the rules of private international law. If, however, one of the terms is 
interpreted as not excluding the CISG, the judge would look to the 
general principles on which the CISG is based as directed by Article 
7(2). This general principle, I suggest, is to enforce the agreement of 
the parties when interpretation of their statements and acts under 
Article 8 show that there is consensus.  The general principle is derived 
from Part II of the CISG and is not bound by any particular 
interpretation of Article 19. In a case where one standard term excludes 
the CISG and the other does not, a court should find that the seller 
and buyer have not agreed to exclude the CISG. 
Sellers and buyers will rarely agree to exclude the CISG without 
designating the law applicable instead. Somewhat more likely is a 
transaction where Party A and Party B negotiate a term excluding the 
CISG and a separate term that designates the law of State Z, a non-
CISG State, as the applicable law.  The judge in this case must answer 
two questions: Did the parties agree to exclude the CISG? and, Did 
the parties effectively choose the law of State Z?  As in the cases 
analyzed in the preceding two paragraphs, the judge should analyze the 
first of these questions in light of the CISG’s general principles on the 
formation of an enforceable agreement. That the parties purport to 
choose the law of State Z as the applicable law is some evidence of 
their intent to exclude the CISG. Whether or not their choice of State 
Z’s law is valid is a separate question.  If the judge concludes that the 
parties agreed to exclude the CISG, the judge must then determine 
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whether rules of private international law would give effect to the 
parties’ choice of the law of State Z. 
These same two questions are posed even if Party A and Party 
B include the exclusion and the choice of the law of State Z in a single 
term of their agreement—or in substantively-equivalent terms in each 
of their standard terms. There is no reason for the judge to analyze the 
case differently. Even if the parties use a more likely formula—the 
term merely designates the law of State Z as the applicable law—there 
are the same two questions and the same analysis. Note, in particular, 
that absent an express exclusion of the CISG the choice of the law of 
State Z might be intended merely to designate the applicable domestic 
law if there are gaps in the CISG.40 
Scenario 4 of the Hague Commentary also involves the same 
two questions and the same analysis. One standard term designates the 
law of State X, which effectively is a choice of the CISG; the other 
standard term designates the law of State Y but expressly excludes 
application of the CISG, which effectively is a choice of the domestic 
law of State Y.  Applying the CISG’s general principles on contract 
formation to the first question, there is no consensus on exclusion of 
the CISG under Article 6 of the CISG.  Nor, as it happens, is there an 
effective choice of the applicable law by application of the analysis 
found in the Commentary to Article 6 of the Hague Principles. The 
analysis of the two questions is simpler and more direct than that based 
solely on Article 6 of the Principles.  It recognizes a role, albeit a 
subordinate one, for private international law.  In other words, the 
analysis is a rational alternative to the reasoning of the Hague 
Principles. 
IV.         ADDITIONAL REMARKS 
Whether one analyzes Scenario 4 using the Hague 
Commentary or my alternative analysis the result is the same: Party A 
and Party B have not agreed to exclude application of the CISG so the 
Convention governs their transaction. Nevertheless, several additional 
remarks are in order. 
                                                 
40   CISG, supra note 5, art. 7(2). 
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First, the Commentary apparently assumes that there is at all 
times an enforceable sales contract.  This is apparently based on the 
concept of severability: whether or not the parties have a contract of 
sale excludes any consideration of choice-of-law terms even if all the 
terms are in a single document. It is difficult to imagine that sellers and 
buyers think of their “deal” as consisting of two distinct contracts. My 
alternate analysis leaves open the question of whether the parties have 
formed a contract of sale. If the parties have not agreed to exclude the 
CISG, a judge will determine whether the parties concluded a sales 
contract by looking to Article 19 and applying it to all terms (including 
the choice-of-law term) of the parties’ deal. 
Second, the Commentary makes the result appear easy by 
simply stating State Y’s contract law rule on battle of forms without 
going through the potentially difficult task of ascertaining and 
interpreting that rule.41  Having reported that the rule is a “knock-out 
rule” the result follows by a simple application of paragraph 1 b) of 
Article 6 of the Hague Principles: “if the parties have used standard 
terms designating two different laws and . . . [if] under one or both of 
these laws no standard terms prevail, there is no choice of law.”42 
Under the “knock-out rule” of State Y, no standard term prevails so 
there is no choice of law. In practice, however, identifying how a 
jurisdiction deals with conflicting standard terms may be contentious 
and time-consuming—and in the case of conflicting standard choice-
of-law terms the analysis will have to be done for each of the 
jurisdictions designated in the conflicting standard terms.43 
Third, it follows from the second point that, if Article 19 of 
the CISG is interpreted as adopting a “knock-out rule,”44 parties will 
never chose the applicable law if one of the parties designates the law 
                                                 
41   Hague Principles, supra note 1, Commentary ¶ 6.24. 
42   Id. at art. 6 1 b). 
43   If the CISG is interpreted as adopting a knock-out rule, there never 
will be a choice of law when one of the States is a CISG state. The answer to scenarios 
like that of Scenario 4 will always be that there is no choice of law.  The Hague 
Commentary avoids interpretation of Article 19 because the scenario itself states that 
the law of State Y regarding battle of forms applies a knock-out rule. 
44   It should be noted that the Hague Commentary quite rightly does not 
interpret Article 19, merely calling attention to the several possible interpretations 
recognized in case law and the literature. 
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of a CISG state as the applicable law. The answer to scenarios like that 
of Scenario 4 will always then be that there is no choice of law 
agreement.  This would simplify analysis using the Commentary’s 
approach because no further analysis is necessary if one party has 
designated a CISG state. 
Finally, by commenting on the interface between the Principles 
and the CISG only with respect to the “battle of forms,” the 
Commentary misses an opportunity to provide a more systematic 
analysis of that interface.  If, for example, the parties are not located in 
different Contracting States, what is the relation of the Hague 
Principles to CISG Article 1(1)(b)? Even within Article 6 of the 
Principles there are questions that might have been addressed. 
Consider the following variation on Scenario 4: 
Party A’s standard terms designate the law of State Z, a non-
CISG State, and Party B’s standard terms neither exclude the CISG 
nor choose an applicable law.  (All other facts remain the same as in 
Scenario 4.) 
Paragraph 1 b) of Article 6 is not relevant–the parties’ standard 
terms have not chosen two different laws—so paragraph 1 a) is the 
relevant rule.  As a similar provision in Article 10 of the Rome I 
Regulation is interpreted,  the law of State Z is the law the two parties 
“purportedly agreed to.”45 In such a case, Professor Kadner argues that 
the domestic contract law of State Z determines whether the choice is 
valid.46  If it is valid, the Principles would conclude that, because the 
CISG is not the law in State Z, the parties had excluded the CISG even 
though Party A and Party B have their places of business in different 
Contracting States.  By contrast, an analysis that applies the CISG 
principles to determine whether the parties have agreed to exclude the 
CISG would look to the statements and acts of both parties rather than 
a “purported agreement” derived from only one of them.  The silence 
of Party B should not be deemed an acceptance of Party A’s term.  This 
is a general principle found in Article 18(1) of the CISG (“Silence . . . 
does not in itself amount to acceptance.”).47  Moreover, given the 
                                                 
45  Council Regulation 593/2008, The Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6.  
46   Kadner, supra note 7, at 94-99. 
47   CISG, supra note 5, art. 18(1). 
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widespread adoption of the CISG, Party B’s silence may reflect a 
judgment that there is no need to choose a law when dealing with 
businesses located in other Contracting States because the CISG will 
apply and Party B thinks its provisions satisfactory.  This analysis leads 
to the conclusion that Party A and Party B have not agreed to exclude 
the CISG. 
The Commentary’s relatively straightforward analysis of 
Scenario 4 may leave the impression that all applications of the Hague 
Principles will be equally straightforward. This is not the case. The 
Commentary rightly points to the potential importance of applying the 
Principles to CISG transactions. It is unfortunate—but understandable 
for reasons of space—that the Commentary addresses only one 
scenario.  For informed analysis of additional scenarios, the reader 
must look to Professor Kadner’s separate publication.48 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I analyze the relation of the Hague Principles on 
the Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts to the CISG 
when a seller and a buyer exchange different choice-of-law terms in 
their standard terms.  I have done so by studying a scenario (“Scenario 
4”) in the Commentary to Article 6 of the Principles. The thesis of the 
paper is that the solution offered in the Commentary is not the only 
reasonable way to analyze the scenario.  In support of my thesis it is 
not necessary that I demonstrate that my analysis is the only proper 
analysis or even that my analysis is the better one. I merely have to 
show that a rational judge or arbitrator might choose my analysis over 
that offered by the Commentary.  If I am persuasive, adoption of the 
Principles should not be read as endorsing the Commentary solution 
as definitive.49 
 
                                                 
48   Kadner, supra note 7, at 94-99. 
49   The final text of the Commentary adds a final sentence to paragraph 
6.23: “The interpretations of the CISG in this Commentary do not purport to be 
exclusive or authoritative interpretations of the CISG by the Hague Conference or 
its members.” See supra, note 1.  
